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ABSTRACT 
Gilbert Simondon has recently attracted the interest of political philosophers and theorists, 
despite he is rather renowned as a philosopher of technics – as the author of Of the Mode of 
Existence of Technical Objects – who also elaborated a general theory of complex systems in 
Individuation in the Light of the Notions of Form and Information. A group of scholars has 
developed Gilles Deleuze’s early suggestion that Simondon’s social ontology might offer the 
basis for a re-theorisation of radical democracy. Others, following Herbert Marcuse, have 
instead focused on Simondon’s analysis of the relationship between technology and society. 
However, only a joint study of Simondon’s two major works can reveal their implicit 
political stakes. As I will argue, Simondon’s anti-Aristotelianism and his anti-Heideggerian 
understanding of the Greek origins of philosophy, allow us to conceive philosophical thought 
as a ‘tradition of invention’, that is, a pedagogical techn! endowed with the political task of 
maintaining the openness of the social system and allowing normative invention to emerge 
from within. 
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In recent years, the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon has been feted as an original 
political thinker. In many ways, the very absence of an explicit political position in his 
writings helps to explain the lively debate surrounding the political questions that appear to 
emerge from both his philosophy of individuation and his philosophy of technics, which he 
developed respectively in Individuation in the Light of the Notions of Form and Information, 
and Of the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, first presented for his doctorate in 1958.1 
A group of scholars has, on this score, sought to renew Gilles Deleuze’s early suggestion that 
Individuation might offer the basis for a social ontology of the “transindividual collective” 
(Deleuze, 1966, p. 124) capable of contrasting the methodological individualism dominating 
much contemporary political thinking (Balibar, 1997, pp. 10-11, 22-23; Toscano 2006, pp. 
136-42, 147-51; Del Lucchese, 2009; Combes, 2013, pp. 25-50). Other scholars have instead 
followed up on Herbert Marcuse’s cursory reading (1964, p. 159) of Simondon’s analysis of 
the relationship between technology and society originally outlined in Du mode (Feenberg, 
1991, pp. 194-95; Stiegler, 1998, pp. 80-94; see also De Boever, 2012). However, as the 
following pages will seek to demonstrate, only a joint study of the two texts can reveal their 
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implicit political stakes and clarify the genuinely political significance of Simondon’s 
thought. 
This article examines the complex combination of epistemology, psycho-sociology, 
and philosophy of technology that makes up Simondon’s œuvre (see Barthélémy, 2008; 
Guchet, 2010; Bardin, 2015), and attempts to articulate what contribution his work can 
represent to the understanding of the political nature of philosophy itself. It will start by 
showing how Simondon’s model for understanding systems in general, and social systems in 
particular, represents an alternative to the traditional organic and mechanical models of the 
body politic. What links Simondon’s twofold research into one project is an anti-teleological 
understanding both of the functioning of technical objects, and of psychic and collective 
individuation, with the latter grounding his theory of social systems. This theory is founded 
on a concept of culture as the regulatory apparatus of social systems. For Simondon, culture 
mediates between the normative innovation triggered by the emergence of what he calls 
‘technicity’, namely, the theoretical and behavioural norms implicit in technical activity and 
technical objects, and the continuity granted by the social reproduction of the symbolic order. 
However, according to Simondon, the symbolic objects produced by philosophy – which is a 
subset of culture – enjoy a peculiar relation to the destabilising and inventive force of 
technicity that remains to be explored. 
With this background in place, the article goes on to demonstrate that Aristotle’s and 
any other subordinations of techn! to what is considered an eminent human activity, either 
contemplation (theoresis) or action (praxis), is grounded on the same ontological 
subordination and de-politicisation of production (poiesis). Simondon’s attack on Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism suggests that philosophy should instead be conceived as political techn!, 
whose products are inherently related to technical mentality and pedagogy. Such a conception 
is what separates Simondon from Heidegger. As an analysis of Simondon’s interpretation of 
pre-Socratic thought will demonstrate, his care for technicity aims at reversing the 
Heideggerian ‘care’ [Sorge] of thinking against its alleged reduction to technics. According 
to Simondon, ‘technicity’ marks the very origin of philosophical thought. Since its very 
inception with the Ionian thinkers, philosophy has been related to technical problems the 
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solution of which have an impact on social relations and norms (Individuation, pp. 511-16). 
In this sense technicity is far from politically neutral, and philosophy can be seen as an 
intrinsically political activity whose effects have always been to spark normative innovation 
and to enable its integration into culture. 
I will argue that Simondon’s unconventional, and clearly anti-Heideggerian, 
understanding of pre-Socratic thought allows him to view philosophy as a ‘tradition of 
invention’, that is, as a pedagogical techn! entrusted with the political task of maintaining the 
openness of society and allowing normative invention to emerge from within. This 
perspective will support my hypothesis that although the ontological and epistemological 
issues raised in Individuation go far beyond the philosophy of technics developed in Du mode, 
the two works should be read together against the background of Simondon’s overall 
endeavour to address the contrast between culture and technology. Indeed, this project was 
political qua pedagogical, and Simondon’s two major philosophical works were intended by 
their author as symbolic artefacts that aimed to integrate technical normativity into culture so 
as to trigger political transformations. 
 
What Model for the Body Politic? 
Following the scientific revolution, the clockwork nature theorised by early modern natural 
philosophers began to colonise all fields of the philosophical imaginary. In political theory, 
although the traditional organic model – the origin of which was both biological and 
theological (Kantorowicz, 1957) – maintained an undisputed scientific primacy, the idea of a 
‘political automaton’ also had an enormous impact. The metaphor of the machine advanced 
from the nature-machine to the animal-machine and, finally, to the theory of the state, leading, 
from Hobbes to Frederick the Great, to a new understanding of the body politic 
comprehended from the perspective of its modern, technological administration (Mayr, 1986, 
pp. 102-14; Harvey, 2007, pp. 35-38). In opposition to this theoretical course, the metaphor 
was intended to serve as a warning against any attempt to restrict the liberty of human beings 
and their capacity for self-regulation to the supposedly automatic, ‘inhuman’, functioning of 
nature and the state (Mayr, 1986, pp. 139-89). The mechanistic imaginary forged in early 
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modern philosophy therefore nurtured different forms of metaphysical commitment either for 
or against the mechanisation of human beings and society, and thus also prescribed a choice 
between a closed community characterised by a strong natural identity or an artificial society 
of atomic individuals. This apparent alternative still dominated the Positivist attempt to 
provide society with a regulatory apparatus that synthesised the advantages of organicism and 
those of mechanism (Schlanger, 1995, pp. 57-60). 
Simondon’s theory of social systems proceeds from a point beyond this duality, 
following Georges Canguilhem’s refutation of the Positivist synthesis. Although Canguilhem 
states that society is ‘both machine and life’ (Canguilhem, 2002, p. 121), he argues that it 
does not possess a regulatory apparatus, since ‘justice, the supreme regulation, does not 
appear in the form of an apparatus produced by society itself’ (Canguilhem, 2002, p. 122). In 
this context, Canguilhem defines ‘justice’ as an act of political invention that must be 
distinguished from the ‘institutions of justice’. He explains that it can only come ‘from 
elsewhere [d’ailleurs]’, as is ‘added onto [surajoutée]’ society, originating outside of any 
homeostatic or reproductive process (Canguilhem, 2002, p. 121-25). Setting himself against 
the ancient myth of an organic body politic – in which justice resides in its first principle, 
whether transcendent (divine) or immanent (natural) – and also against the modern 
mechanistic conception of a social automaton – in which justice depends on a rationally 
established normativity – Canguilhem follows Bergson (1932) in seeing society as 
characterised by a general tendency towards entropy that is punctuated by exceptional 
moments of heroic invention. Irrespective of whether this Bergsonian vitalism is 
Canguilhem’s (or even Bergson’s) final word on the subject, it should be understood as the 
basis of Simondon’s attack on the false alternative between biological and mechanical 
models, and his conceptualisation of politics as a field that has no fixed teleology and is open 
to normative invention. 
Simondon’s understanding of social regulation functions as a critique of both the 
ancient notion of a natural or divine justice that is inherent to the body politic, and the 
modern myth of an artificial body politic, which he sees as still constituting Norbert Wiener’s 
technocratic cybernetics (1954).2 From Simondon’s perspective, both these approaches 
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ultimately disavow the social system’s structural lack of regulation through the belief in an 
underlying teleology. In the first case, conceptions of divinely established or natural goals 
inherent to the body politic ground attempts to maintain and defend its overall functioning as 
defined by these goals. In the second, conceptions of a purely mechanical body politic serve 
to legitimate the model of a disembodied rationality seeking technological control over the 
variability of nature in general, and of human nature in particular. 
For Simondon, Wiener’s cybernetic model represents the latest incarnation of the 
deterministic and homeostatic machine that originated in seventeenth-century mechanical 
philosophy. The limitations of this model can be delineated through Wiener’s own concept of 
metastability (Simondon, 2014, p. 236). Any ‘stable’ system is doomed to collapse, as it is 
unable to convert internal tensions through structural reconfigurations, and is thus subject to 
an inevitable entropic tendency (Individuation, pp. 206, 213). ‘Metastability’, on the other 
hand, characterises systems whose structure is open to further transformation because its 
equilibrium contains potential energy that is not fully stabilised. This concept allows 
Simondon to define society as a non-homeostatic system: 
Nothing allows us to consider society as the domain of an absolute homeostasis. 
Norbert Wiener seems to put forward an unnecessary assumption [postulat de 
valeurs], namely, that proper homeostatic regulation is an ultimate end of societies 
and the ideal that should drive every act of government. (Du mode, p. 151) 
Beyond the alternative between a naturally stable, organic body politic and an artificially 
stabilised, mechanical social automaton, Simondon is instead drawn to the model of an ‘open 
machine’, comprising the metastability of the system and the indeterminacy of the processes 
to which it is always irreducibly exposed. According to him, the regulatory apparatus of 
social systems cannot be tied to any specific form of finality, whether an internal and 
reproductive finality, as in an organism, or an externally imposed and deterministic one, as in 
a machine. Both types of model are too abstract and hence incapable of describing the 
functioning of social systems accurately. In fact, they both fall short of capturing the actual 
functioning of real organisms and machines. Indeed, there can be no such thing as an 
automaton: any actual machine, such as an organism, ‘presupposes a regulation’ precisely 
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because it ‘harbours a certain degree of indeterminacy in its functioning’ that allows for 
information exchange with the environment (Du mode, p. 138). 
From this perspective, the two classical models for the body politic can be seen to 
lead to the same reduction of political invention to the normal functioning of the system, that 
is, to either a natural (internal) finality, or a mechanical (external) one. To these models 
Simondon instead adds a decisive ‘quantistic’ dimension (Barthélémy, 2008, pp. 24-34). At 
all levels – physical, biological, psychic, and collective – systems can only survive so long as 
they possess a sufficient margin of indeterminacy that allows them to undergo change. This 
evolutionary openness, of course, entails a degree of risk, but without it the survival of the 
system as a whole would be impossible. Intervention aimed at interrupting the automatic 
inertia of the system is necessary in order to contrast its entropic tendencies. 
In his theory of social systems, Simondon defines such a risky, though necessary, 
intervention as an ‘act of government’. Such a political act of invention is less a kind of 
revolutionary event, and more an evolutionary risk that must be taken. By breaking the 
instituted order, such a gesture is always dangerous, and yet it is required to stop the order 
from steadily dissolving. As long as a situation is rich in potentials (i.e. metastable), an act of 
government remains possible: 
Just as the living relies on homeostases for developing and becoming instead of 
remaining perpetually in the same state, in the act of government there is also a force 
of absolute origination [force d’avènement absolu], which, although relying on 
homeostases, uses and exceeds them. (Du mode, p. 151) 
By ‘act of government’ Simondon here does not mean an act aimed at the reproduction of 
existing conditions depending on human nature, but rather a form of artisanal techn! of 
invention that seeks to establish new interactions between existing processes. Such a techno-
political gesture is a combination of theory and practice. In this sense, a theory of the social 
system makes possible the establishment of the conditions of emergence of an act of 
government, while a practical decision entails an acknowledgement of the impossibility of 
planning its outcomes entirely. Simondon thus conceives of politics as a problematic field in 
search of a solution that cannot, however, be planned from the outset: that is to say, 
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normative invention can only be the outcome of a process of experimentation in which 
finalities are allowed to emerge within political struggles, rather than depending on a specific 
theory of human nature. 
In fact, Simondon’s theory transfers the focus on human nature traditionally held in 
political thought to political processes and relations as such. Simondon’s thinking on psychic 
and collective individuation is at the heart of this gesture: it serves to demystify the very 
scope of political theory by dethroning the image of human nature, which the political-
philosophical conception of the body politic has always been based on, including the modern 
notion of an individualistic nature of human beings that can be artificially organised. 
Simondon subtracts political theory from all dialectics of individual and society. As will be 
discussed below, the biological, technical, psychic and collective processes analysed by 
Simondon under the concept of the ‘transindividual’ are neither independent of, nor entirely 
determined by, individual agency. Instead, they comprehend the individual as part of a 
broader set of systemic relations by which the latter is both mediated and constituted, playing 
different roles according to the shifting configuration of the system. 
From this perspective, the problem for politics is that of the relation between the 
existing configuration of the social system and the possible emergence – from within it – of a 
normative invention that would affect all of its apparatuses of homeostatic regulation: beliefs, 
myths, norms, jurisprudence, institutions. Within such a complex system there can be no 
expectation of a definitive, ‘neutral’, solution to political problems, because theory itself is 
embedded in a complex set of normativities that undermine the very distinction between 
theory and praxis. As we shall see, this makes of what Simondon calls ‘philosophical thought’ 
a specific kind of political techn! of normative invention, the function of which cannot be 
understood without first grasping its peculiar relation to technics and, more generally, to the 
regulative function of culture within social systems. 
 
Culture as the Regulatory Apparatus of Social Systems 
The function Simondon attributes to culture as a regulatory apparatus of social systems can 
only be grasped with an adequate understanding of the concept of the transindividual. 
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Simondon’s basic assumption is that human nature is as much a factor of destabilisation as of 
structuration within society. He argues that what most puts at risk the normative stability of 
social systems are the biological and technical patterns that characterise individual and 
collective behaviour (Individuation, p. 508). In this sense, ‘human nature’ is not merely a 
given fact, but the biological-technical basis for processes of psychic and collective (that is 
‘transindividual’) individuation, out of which a symbolic milieu of ‘norms which do not exist 
at the biological level’ emerges (Individuation, p. 282). 
Human nature can thus be said to always exceed the established normativity of a 
social system in at least two ways. On the one hand, biological normativity re-appears in the 
form of instinct at the moment of birth, thereby making each new individual and its drives a 
sort of biological surplus, namely, a problem of integration that must be solved through 
education – the symbolic capture into an ‘elementary normativity ... affecting the individual’ 
and without which society would be impossible (Individuation, p. 506). On the other hand, 
technical normativity represents a constant challenge to the self-referential continuity of the 
symbolic milieu which regulates social reproduction. As a result, technical normativity is 
driven by an irreducible relation to changes in the natural environment where its products – 
namely, technical objects – must necessarily be embedded in order to function. 
In short, both biological and technical normativities – which depend on the long-term 
historicity of the natural environment – cannot be entirely absorbed within the recurring 
normativity established by symbolic practices, which, by contrast, depends on the specific 
historicity of each social system. In this sense, both biological and technical normativities 
force the social system to repeat the effort of symbolising their products. This is an endless 
effort, because, although what is organic and technical always threatens the system’s stability, 
it cannot simply be neutralised, as it is the precondition of at once its existence and 
functioning. Therefore it has to be continuously ‘manipulated’ in order to maintain group 
cohesion. What intervenes to stabilise the system at this level is culture, by, as Simondon puts 
it, ‘MANIPULATING in some way the symbols representing such a technical gesture or such 
a biological drive’ (Individuation, p. 504). But the efficacy of such an operation of ‘human 
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engineering [manipulation humaine]’ is always partial, precisely because of what ‘human 
nature’ is (or, more accurately, what it is not). 
As Simondon suggests, the transindividual relations emerging from this process 
constantly integrate the normativities exceeding the normal functioning of the social system 
by ‘enveloping them [les enveloppant]’ with a layer of ‘significations’ (Individuation, p. 307). 
This ‘essentially regulative [régulatrice par essence]’ layer of significations is culture (Du 
mode, p. 16). Thus, in a crucial passage in Du mode, Simondon defines culture as the 
regulatory apparatus of social systems: 
Culture is that through which human beings regulate their relation to the world and to 
themselves … [It is] that part of human reality that can be modified … the active 
intermediary between successive generations [across time], coeval human groups 
[across space], and between successive or coexistent individuals [across both time and 
space]. (Du mode, p. 227, italics added) 
Culture is active because, despite depending on a technical-biological ‘base’, it is not simply 
its super-structural or mythological expression. It is not, in Simondon’s words, the ‘means of 
expression’ to which both Marxism and Freudianism reduce it, but rather ‘a set of action 
potentials, equipped with highly complex schemas ready to be actualised’ (Individuation, p. 
504). And it is an active intermediary, which, by retroacting on the biological and technical 
normativities on which it in turn relies, serves to modify the functioning and development of 
the individuals involved and of the social system at the same time. 
It is in this sense that culture can be said to be ‘reflexive’ and regulative. Simondon’s 
peculiar use of the term ‘reflexivity’ points to the feedback effect that the intermediary 
apparatus of ‘culture’ enacts on the social system. This apparatus integrates proto-social 
normativities (biological and technical) into a ‘tradition’ sedimented as part of a shared 
symbolic milieu. Technical activity, however, is suspended, as it were, between nature and 
culture, and therefore plays a unique role within social dynamics. This role is to be 
differentiated not in terms of contents, but in terms of the separate functional supply that 
technics provides to the value-structure of the social system. On the one hand, biological 
norms introduce into the social system a ‘binary’ logic, which is typical of a ‘closed 
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community’ and is ultimately founded on organisms’ natural opposition between ‘good’ and 
‘poisonous’. This tendency towards closure is instituted within human communities as an 
opposition between sacred and profane, which divides and separates what is internal from 
what is external to the community. Thus from the perspective established by sacredness 
‘external communities are conceived – because external – as bad’. The ‘bipolarity of values’, 
which underwrites notions of the sacred, thereby finds itself in tension with technical activity, 
which instead brings forward a ‘unipolarity of values’ tending towards constructive 
integration (Individuation, p. 509). 
This opposition between sacredness and technicity accounts for the tension between 
‘closing’ and ‘opening’ processes within the social system. Simondon explicitly frames this, 
notably in his text Psychosociologie de la technicité, as a tension between the regulative 
function of ‘sacredness’ (and, to a certain extent, of the symbolic function in general), and the 
inventive function of ‘technicity’ – which is crystallised within technical objects (see 
Simondon, 2014, pp. 67-69, 116-17, 127) as ‘a set of sensory-motor schemas, rationally 
intertwined and organised, as in an organism’ (Van Caneghem, 1989, p. 824). Technicity 
relies on ‘schemas of action’, which functionally reflect biological needs shared by the entire 
species and depend on the matter on which they act. As Simondon makes clear, ‘technical 
norms are entirely accessible to the individual without him needing to rely on a social 
normativity’. Consequently, technical normativity can circulate between different social 
systems, bypassing what Simondon refers to as their ‘collective mythology’ (Individuation, 
pp. 513-14). Thus, following in the footsteps of the French paleoanthropologist Leroi-
Gourhan (1943-45), Simondon maintains that the adoption of any technique has intrinsic 
political implications: 
When a closed society incorporates a new technique, it also incorporates the values 
inherent to the social character of that technique, thereby giving rise to a restructuring 
of its own value system. Since all communities use techniques or are bound to 
introduce new ones, no community can be either completely closed or not subject to 
evolutionary change. (Individuation, pp. 513) 
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Against this background, the intrinsic political power of philosophy – understood as a 
reflexive activity that produces symbolic objects – can finally be grasped. According to 
Simondon, ‘philosophical thought’ emerges out of processes of psychic and collective 
invention, which serve to restructure the normative underpinnings of the social system as a 
whole. Crucially, as a subset of the cultural apparatus, philosophical thought might be said 
to carry the same regulative function: by retroacting, or ‘reflecting’, on the cultural milieu of 
which it is a part, philosophical thought acts on the social system as a higher-order regulatory 
mechanism that provides stability. In this sense, philosophy works as an element of culture 
capable of modifying the regulatory apparatus itself in accordance with the discontinuities 
that emerge from human biology and technical invention. Thus Simondon explicitly 
conceives of his philosophical enterprise – and of Du mode in particular – as an attempt to 
integrate technology into culture – the regulatory apparatus of the social system – through the 
means of philosophical reflection. 
However, for Simondon, philosophy cannot be restricted to the merely regulative role 
of stabilising culture because it enjoys a specific relation with technical activity. Like 
technical products, the symbolic products of philosophical thought are constantly interacting 
with the configuration of the cultural milieu out of which they emerge. Within this milieu, 
these symbolic objects circulate in the form of a discontinuous pattern, which is 
transformative rather than reproductive precisely because of the original relation between 
‘philosophical thought’ and ‘technicity’. Tracing this relation back to its pre-Socratic roots is 
thus the key to Simondon’s own philosophical practice of thinking as a special kind of 
political techn!. But this aspect cannot be uncovered before clarifying how Simondon’s 
attack on Aristotle’s notion of techn! supports his critique of Heidegger’s understanding of 
the relation between techn! and thinking. 
 
Aristotle, Heidegger, and the Subordination of Techn! 
Simondon’s conception of an original connection between philosophical thought and 
technicity is an implicit response to Canguilhem’s elliptical claim that at stake in his 
philosophy is ‘a new kind of Aristotelianism’ based on contemporary telecommunication 
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technologies (Canguilhem, 1998, pp. 277-78). In fact, Simondon explicitly based his 
philosophy of individuation on a direct critique of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, which he 
considered a basic misunderstanding of technics that grounds and affects his whole 
philosophical system. 
As the following will show, Simondon saw the anthropomorphism of Aristotle’s 
‘hylomorphic schema’ as responsible for the opposition of the activity of an agent (form) to 
the passivity of a subject (matter) displayed in his ontology. Moreover, Simondon’s critique 
of hylomorphism can be extended to Aristotle’s epistemological distinction, outlined in the 
Nicomacheian Ethics, between the different forms of knowledge, namely the ‘habits (hexeis)’ 
through which the soul possesses truth: techn! (technical knowledge), phron!sis (practical 
wisdom), and epist!m! (science) (see Nicomachean Ethics, VI.3-8, 1139b15-1142a30, where 
sophia and nous are also included). Implicit in Aristotle’s hierarchical distinction of different 
forms of knowledge had been a devaluation of poiesis (production) to a subordinate or 
inferior form of human activity compared to praxis (action) and theorein (contemplation). In 
my view, this underlying assumption of an ontological hierarchy of human activities also 
informs Heidegger’s own devaluation of techn!. From this perspective, I am going to explain 
how Simondon’s appeal to Ionian philosophers targets both Aristotle’s subordination of 
poiesis to praxis and theorein, and Heidegger’s critique of the Greek ‘reduction’ of thinking 
to technology. 
Simondon opens Individuation with a critique of Aristotle’s ‘hylomorphic schema’ 
and its latent but undisputed dominion over both common sense and philosophical and 
scientific thought (Individuation, pp. 48 ff). Although he does not explicitly take on the task 
of criticising Aristotle’s conception of techn!, what Simondon says on technicity can be read 
as going against the rooting of both concepts in a dualistic distinction between form and 
matter. In Aristotle’s hylomorphism, the separation between form and matter corresponds to 
the separation of a natural goal from its achievement, which is not necessary but only 
possible (necessity is limited to the unchanging subjects of the theoretical sciences). This 
distinction – which in Aristotle is even more fundamental than that between nature and 
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artifice – constitutes the fundamental tension at the heart of techn!, as a form of knowledge 
related to poiesis, namely, the human activity of supplying matter with form. 
For Aristotle, technai are ‘productive sciences [epistemai]’ (Metaphysics, IX.2, 
1046b3; see also Nicomachean Ethics, VI.4) defining areas of limited but systematic craft-
knowledge. Within these areas, technai are said to actualise their ends, setting the adequate 
means for their realisation while eschewing deviations. Aristotle’s ‘official’ notion of techn!, 
which is determined as the form of knowledge corresponding to poiesis, refers to the knower 
concerned with production (poiesis) as opposed to the practitioner aiming to utilise the 
product (poieton) (e.g. Nicomachean Ethics, 1.7, 1098a29-33; see Dunne, 2009, pp. 249-261). 
This reference to the product is what ultimately grounds the ontological hierarchy that 
drives Aristotle’s differentiation of phron!sis from techn! in book VI: ‘phron!sis cannot be 
… techn! … because acting [praxeos] and producing [poieseos] differ in kind’. ‘Action’ 
(praxis), where human matter is involved in the activity of the actor and the action, ‘is itself 
the end’, and ‘production’ (poiesis), where non-human matter is passive and action upon it 
has ‘external’ ends, constitute different kinds of human action corresponding to separate 
forms of knowledge (Nicomachean Ethics, VI.5, 1140b1-7). Even though praxis cannot itself 
be supreme happiness (eudaimonia) (Nicomachean Ethics, VI.7, 1141a20-22; see also X.6-7), 
phron!sis appears to be a kind of knowledge hierarchically superior to techn!, precisely 
because it works to identify the means to achieve the final aim and supreme good for human 
beings: theoretical wisdom (sophia), which corresponds to the practice of the highest 
theoretical activity, namely, the scientific contemplation of unvarying truths (theorein). 
Nevertheless, it is still in relation to the undisputed superiority of theorein that the 
hierarchy between phron!sis and techn! appears problematic. While the highest form of 
scientific knowledge concerns what is necessary, phron!sis and techn! both concern what 
‘may or may not be’ – namely, the possible – because ‘action’ and ‘production’ (praxis and 
poiesis) both mediate between the potentiality contained in matter and its actualisation 
according to the ends dictated by the form. More precisely, phron!sis rationally sets the 
means required to reach the ends inscribed in human nature, just as technai set the means 
appropriate to their products’ expected functioning. Within this Aristotelian schema, the field 
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of politics is thus marked by the same tension characterising technical production: the 
definition of its necessary goal is entirely a priori and belongs to science, while the 
knowledge of the means to achieve it is a matter of skilled virtue. 
In this sense, hylomorphism can be said to shape Aristotle’s politics by importing into 
its foundations a tension that is already implicit in his notion of techn! – conceived as a 
minor form of science dealing with both the potentiality of matter in its means and the 
actuality of form in its goals. In the field of politics, which is exclusively concerned with 
human praxis, this tension results in a radical separation between an epist!m! of universal 
and necessary ends (practical philosophy) and a specific technique-virtue capable of setting 
the particular and accidental means of its realisation (phron!sis).3 Such a separation between 
a theoretical science of ends and a practical wisdom of deliberation on the right means is 
emblematically represented in Aristotle’s political thought by the figures of Socrates and 
Pericles, the virtuous philosopher who knows the supreme good rooted in human nature, and 
the politician concerned with providing the best means to reach it (Nicomachean Ethics, VI.5, 
1140b8-10). 
Heidegger certainly relies on Aristotle’s account of human life as praxis rather than 
poiesis (Politics, I.4, 1254a7), when he claims that ‘existing is action, praxis’ (Heidegger, 
1998b, p. 48). But what he really aims to challenge is the primacy of theorein. In Being and 
Time, Vorhandenheit (theorein) is secondary and derivative of Zuhandenheit (poiesis), while 
both are grounded on the praxis of Dasein (Volpi, 1994; see also Volpi, 2010, on 
Heidegger’s developing relationship with Aristotle). In this way, Heidegger can affirm the 
primacy of phron!sis. This move reverses but, crucially, does not completely overcome 
Aristotle’s hierarchical classification of the forms of human existence and their 
corresponding forms of knowledge. Instead, it serves to exacerbate the internal tension 
characterising the Aristotelian understanding of techn!. 
Heidegger’s techn! itself is split between an instrumental, productive, and inauthentic 
mode of ‘being in the world’ on the one hand, and a ‘mode of knowledge’ originally 
connected with the unconcealment of truth as aleth!ia on the other – a mode which is 
revealed in the original Greek meaning of techn! as the ‘bringing-forth’ out of concealment 
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which ‘never designates the activity of making’ (Heidegger, 1998a, p. 35). This results in 
Heidegger’s attack on Greek metaphysics, which he accuses of ‘technicising’ thinking 
through the reduction of aleth!ia to the objective presence of beings required by technology. 
On this basis, in The Question Concerning Technology Heidegger criticises modern science 
and technology as embodying the Greek reduction of poiesis to ‘making’, along with the 
oblivion of its original dimension as a ‘bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful’, that is 
poiesis as what is ‘poetical’ (Heidegger, 1993, p. 339). 
Thus ‘reduced’ to technology, techn! entails an ontological separation of the active 
agent that forms from the passive matter receiving this form. This, in turn, implies a 
depreciation of techn!, so long as it is conceived as a kind of knowledge irredeemably 
compromised by the passivity of matter characterising production, and therefore unfit to deal 
with the sphere of human action, namely politics. As a consequence, a ‘political use’ of 
techn! is perceived as potentially dangerous, because it does not respect the original praxis 
characterising human agency. Moreover, it is in this respect that Heidegger develops a 
normative component: we should take care [Sorge] of thinking against its reduction to a 
‘technical use’. The diagnosis dictates the cure: ‘we must free ourselves from the technical 
interpretation of thinking. The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to Plato and 
Aristotle. They take thinking itself to be a techn!, a process of deliberation in service to doing 
and making’ (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 240). 
This vision of techn! is usually shared by all philosophies that, implicitly or explicitly, 
oppose human activity to the alleged passivity of matter – thereby providing human beings 
with a designated ‘political’ status within the rest of nature. It is not by chance that, in this 
sense, the separation between natural and political theory is common to both Arendt’s 
‘Aristotelian’ definition of vita activa and Leo Strauss’s ‘Platonic’ attempt to redefine the 
status of political theory. The two authors seem to have inherited from Heidegger a similar 
understanding of phron!sis as a specifically political form of knowledge, through the 
characterisation of epist!m! and techn! as forms of knowledge equally inadequate to the 
understanding of human nature, partially overlooking Aristotle’s distinction between 
‘practical philosophy’ and ‘practical wisdom’ (phron!sis) (see Berti, 2004). This idea of a 
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specifically human praxis serves to preserve the independence of human political action from 
the supremacy of theory, and, at the same time, defend the field of politics from the risk of 
being submitted to technocracy. 
Following an entirely different path, Simondon takes thinking itself to be a techn!, 
and goes on to develop at the same time an idea of the technicity of philosophical thought as 
something to be taken care of (see Stiegler, 2009; Barthélémy, 2015). This coincides with a 
critique of any hypostatisation of a specific human praxis that may define the field of politics 
(see Guchet 2010, pp. 131-32, 170-72; Bardin 2015, pp. 229-34), going against Heidegger’s 
warning not to ‘take thinking itself to be a techn!’, and even beyond Arendt’s own attempt to 
attribute human content to the ‘world of things’. In fact, Arendt’s valuation of homo faber 
still presupposes a hierarchy of human action, at whose extreme lies a wordless animal 
laborans – a hierarchy, therefore, that is ultimately grounded on the opposition between 
human and animal life (Arendt, 1958; see Loeve 2011, pp. 37-38, 44-47). By contrast, 
Simondon’s philosophy instead challenges the very ontological distinction between inert 
matter and human beings, thereby liberating technics from the Aristotelian ‘hylomorphic 
schema’. Thus, Simondon’s move also collapses the hierarchy between the domains of 
epist!m!, phron!sis and techn!, and any hierarchy between the different fields of human 
activity and knowledge. It was from this hierarchy that Western political theory emerged as a 
peculiar science dealing with the political nature of humans defined in opposition to their 
divine capacity to contemplate truth, on the one hand, and their animal necessity to work for 
survival, on the other. 
Against this background, Simondon appeals to Ionian philosophy as the common 
source of philosophical thought and technicity. In an implicit challenge to Heidegger’s 
sequence of ‘inceptional’ thinkers (Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides) (Heidegger, 
1992, pp. 7-8), Simondon argues that the technicity originally inhabiting the Ionian 
philosophy of physis was betrayed by Eleatic philosophy, which preluded Attic dualism, 
namely, ‘a type of thinking … resulting from a veritable break within experience, and 
dividing world and knowledge in order to oppose itself to the genetic and experimental 
positivism of physis’ (Individuation, p. 341). As he sought an alternative to Heidegger’s 
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interpretation of pre-Socratic thought as the ‘disclosure of the Being of beings as a problem’ 
(Heidegger, 2008, p. 46), Simondon portrayed the dawn of Western philosophy as an original 
betrayal of the technical and experimental nature of ‘philosophical thought’ (Individuation, p. 
339). Thus he challenged the very opposition between thinking and techn! – a position which, 
as the following pages will show, is exemplified in his notion of ‘philosophical thought’ as a 
political-pedagogical techn!. 
 
Philosophical Thought as Political Techn! 
Simondon opens his History of the Notion of the Individual by referring to pre-Socratic 
thought as a source of ‘reflexive processing [élaboration réflexive]’ (Individuation, p. 339). 
According to Duhem (2012), Simondon’s interpretation of pre-Socratic thought relies on the 
‘reflexive potential’ offered by their philosophy of physis. In my view, this claim should be 
rather understood in light of a passage in his Complementary Note, where he states that 
‘Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes [were] first of all technicians’, namely, that each of them 
represented a ‘pure individual who brings together within himself the two conditions of 
reflexive thought [pensée reflexive], organic life and technical life’ (Individuation, pp. 511-
12). The ‘technician’ is partially detached from his community because he is embedded in the 
biologically based universality that characterises the technical relationship to nature 
(Simondon 2010, p. 233). This position is what makes of the philosophers of physis the 
models of ‘pure individuals’, capable of a ‘direct dialogue with the world’, that is able to 
invent and mediate the potentially universal relation between social systems and ‘non social’ 
objects (Individuation, pp. 512). 
In the closing sentence of Individuation Simondon explicitly identifies such an 
individual as ‘the amplifier issued from Nature’ through which ‘societies become a World’ 
(Individuation, p. 335). This means that, for Simondon, the mediation between social groups 
and their common natural milieu is an inherently technical relation, one that is marked by the 
mediating function of individuals in which a ‘technical mentality’ is embedded. In his 
conclusion to the Complementary Note he goes even further, recognising such a function in 
the technical object itself, as it ‘goes beyond the communitarian reality in order to institute a 
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relation with Nature’, thanks to the technical normativity with which it is endowed 
(Individuation, p. 527, see also p. 523, and Simondon, 2005b, p. 85). What is of real concern 
here is not the nature of the actor, but the very potentials for normative invention conveyed. 
These technical ‘mediators’ circulate, and retroact onto the cultures they emerge from 
through a ‘feedback’ – or, Simondon puts it, ‘reflexive’ – effect, inducing the emergence of 
normative invention and the political transformation of the social system concerned. 
Among these mediators, the symbolic products of philosophy play a very special role. 
When referring to the ‘great path’ opened by the Greeks, Simondon defines philosophy as the 
teaching of ‘inspiring’ and ‘fertile’ ‘a priori images’ that, once ‘integrated in the world as 
long term anticipations’, act as the seeds of political innovation (Simondon, 2008, p. 61). The 
symbolic objects produced by philosophy should thus be considered as mediators of political 
action because they are the products of processes of collective invention that – through 
pedagogical practice – can retroact on the very processes of individual and collective 
individuation they emerge from, thereby catalysing normative invention. Thus understood, 
philosophy possesses an irreducible political dimension because a mixed symbolically and 
technically mediated relation defines the human political ‘condition’, where communitarian 
constraints are constantly crossed by the universalising tendency of technics. In this 
‘metastable’ field, the internal tensions characterising the symbolic products of philosophy 
show their connection to both technicity and sacredness, thus making philosophy at once 
‘constructive and regulative of culture’ (Du mode, p. 212, italics added). 
From this standpoint, Simondon’s conception of Ionian philosophy as a source of 
‘reflexive processing’ can be seen as aimed at conceiving philosophy itself as a special kind 
of pedagogical techn!. And, in effect, Simondon’s enterprise as a whole presupposes that the 
productions of philosophical thinking cannot be confined to the domain of contemplation, 
and are in fact entangled in a pedagogical practice specifically concerned with technics. Since 
his earliest pedagogical activity as a lycée philosophy professor in 1953-54, Simondon sought 
to plan the development of a ‘technical mentality’ (Simondon, 2014, pp. 203, 224, 233; see 
Carrozzini, 2011). Informed by knowledge of the actual functioning of technical objects, as 
well as a rejection of all abstract representations of their functioning (whether through 
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biological analogies or the still too simplistic image of machines provided by classical 
mechanics), technical mentality would open theory to new ‘schemas’ for envisaging political 
regulation (Simondon, 2012, pp. 3-4). The political implications of such a pedagogy of 
technicity lie in the fact that learning from technical schemas, driven as they are by an open 
and experimental relation to the natural environment, entails the possibility of an escape from 
the normative constraints of a given community, and of the emergence of new values. On the 
contrary, trying to ‘limit the technical gesture according to cultural norms would imply the 
definition of ‘a kingdom of ends, a final code of values’ de facto mirroring and reproducing 
the status quo (Simondon, 2015, p. 21). 
Hence the political efficacy of philosophical thought is to be conceived as a 
paradoxical conservation of the openness of culture to normative invention – a ‘tradition of 
invention’, as I have tried to argue. Such a paradoxical definition can eventually explain the 
common purpose of Simondon’s two major philosophical works. Despite their apparently 
unrelated concerns, i.e. individuation and technics, they are ‘symbolic products’ that look to a 
single Simondonian project of the institution of a political pedagogy of technicity. 
On the one hand, a study of Individuation can be a ‘source of paradigms’ precisely 
because it grasps the actual processes from which it derives its schemas, while the 
hylomorphic schema, on the contrary, by abstractly opposing inert matter to the living, 
isolates philosophy and any form of theory from the mixed biological, technical and political 
milieu it emerges from: 
The opposition between the inert and the living is derived from the hylomorphic 
schema … The study of individuation … is a source of paradigms; yet it cannot 
logically be a source of paradigms unless it can also be, at least hypothetically, a 
grasping of the concrete becoming [devenir réel] out of which the domains of 
application of the schemas it generates constitute themselves. (Individuation, pp. 323-
24) 
On the other hand, the philosophy of technics displayed in Du mode is intended to provide a 
joint epistemological and political impact: 
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The analysis of the mode of existence of technical objects therefore has an 
epistemological significance … [T]he technical operation is a pure operation 
involving the true laws of natural reality … Philosophical thought – insofar as it has 
issued from tradition and employs schemas that have issued from tradition – does not 
entail any reference to this intermediate reality [i.e. technicity] between labour and 
scholé … [However] the [hylomorphic] dualism inherent to philosophical thought … 
will be profoundly modified by the introduction of technical activity as a subject of 
philosophical reflection … It seems that this opposition between action and 
contemplation, between the immutable and the moving, must cease when the technical 
operation is introduced as an element [terme] of reflection and even as a paradigm. 
(Du mode, pp. 255-56) 
According to Simondon, philosophical thought, besides being a part of culture (‘issued from 
tradition’), also depends on a tradition of technical invention. Originally triggered by pre-
Socratic ‘technicians’, the historical connection between philosophy and technics rests on a 
deeper link between the practice of philosophy and technical normativity conceived as a 
vector of social change. From Simondon’s perspective, philosophy is a tradition that emerges 
from the invention and propagation of certain technical objects, archetypal techniques, or 
paradigms. Such a tradition is not composed of universal elements, but rather of ‘patterns’ of 
thinking and action (‘schemas’ in Simondon’s words) that come to be crystallised in the form 
of symbolic artefacts and which are subsequently reactivated in specific circumstances. Since 
its Ionian origin, it is primarily within technical objects and the ‘technical operations’ they 
entail that ‘philosophical thought’ can both find a ground for reflection and establish a 
paradigm, although the reactivation of this reservoir of ideas and schemas of thought has for 
too long been hindered by the integration of philosophy into the regulatory function of 
culture. According to Simondon, it is the intrinsically technical nature of philosophy which – 
following its politico-pedagogical vocation – should be revived in order to aim ‘not only at 
the discovery, but also at the production of genetic essences’ (Du mode, p. 213), that is, 
symbolic objects that convey the schemas of technical operations that are in turn re-invented 
within the historicity of a specific cultural milieu. 
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In light of its original and intrinsic connection to technics on the one hand and 
symbolic practice on the other, philosophy cannot be understood as the property of an 
invariant human nature. It should rather be grasped as a tradition capable of assuming the 
destabilising force of collective processes of invention, and elaborating their integration 
within the regulatory apparatus of social systems, that is culture. Thus the symbolic products 
of philosophy serve as triggers for inherently political processes that de-structure and re-
structure social systems. But philosophy can be the source of social change precisely because 
of its ‘metastability’, a tendency to ‘amplify’ the schemas implicit in other processes – 
whether technical, scientific, ethical, aesthetic or linguistic – that does not follow an entirely 
pre-established normativity. As a consequence, the functioning and efficacy of philosophy 
cannot be secured once and for all. It can only continue under the condition of the renewed 
collective invention and integration of its products within different social systems and across 
different historical epochs, and, for this very reason, what Simondon calls ‘philosophical 
thought’ is open to the permanent risk of extinction. Simondon conceived his own research as 
part of this struggle for the continuation of philosophical thought, and the unity of his œuvre 
can only be perceived from such a perspective, which also involves a plea for the intrinsic 
political significance of the philosophy of technics. 
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1
 While Du mode was immediately published in 1958, only the first part of Individuation 
(Simondon, 1964) appeared in print during Simondon’s lifetime. I will hereafter use the 
following abbreviations: Simondon, 2005a[1958] = Individuation; Simondon, 1989[1958] = 
Du mode. I have provided my own translations of Simondon’s works, or modified the 
translations I refer to, according to my interpretation. 
2
 Simondon’s project for a ‘general theory of the human sciences’ was an original reworking 
of the French sociological tradition that relied on a critical revision of the concepts of form 
and information elaborated within the Gestalttheorie and cybernetics (Guchet, 2011; see in 
particular Individuation, pp. 531-55). Because the focus of this article is Simondon’s work, I 
shall avoid references to twentieth-century social system theories, such as those of Talcott 
Parsons and Luhmann, which Simondon does not deal with in his writings. 
3
 The distinction between phron!sis, techn! and epist!m! in Nicomachean Ethics, VI, is not to 
be confused with the distinction between ‘practical, productive or theoretical’ sciences in 
Metaphysics, VI.2, precisely because sciences (epist!mai) do not deal with ‘the accidental’ as 
phron!sis and techn! have to. 
